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Abstract: This article tries to scrutinize the complexity of 
dealing with the attempts at crafting democracy in In-
donesia. It relates the issue of deploying religion among 
Muslim actors with the issue of state-market power-
relations. With regard to the failing attempts of democra-
tization, the writer argues that the problem does not lie 
with religion and Islam as such, but with democratisation 
that has run aground for a number of reasons. The real 
challenge is to develop more independent means of 
political representation. In his opinion, quoting Demos’ 
survey, the major task in the country at large is to build 
popularly rooted and representative civic-political orga-
nisations. He goes on to argue that while Muslim politics 
may promote measures against corruption, and neo-liberal 
actors may foster the rule of the laws they have shaped, 
both tendencies neglect independent popular represen-
tation to promote politically equal control of public affairs. 
Keywords: Democracy, civil society, equal citizenship, 
public sphere, Muslim democrats.  
Introduction 
The most frequently asked question for me during the last few 
years is no doubt this: “you who work on problems of democracy in 
the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, 
Indonesia, tell us now:  isn’t it so that Islam is the epitome antithesis to 
democracy and human rights?” I am not an expert on Islam, but I 
know something of politics and democracy. The question is a good 
one, because the answer is not as obvious or as clear as one should 
care to think.  
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That is to say, democracy is of course undermined if it is a God 
and this God’s representatives who are to decide how society should 
be run and governed, and not the people on the basis of political 
equality and their own interpretation of the world. But first, this 
perception is not limited to Islam alone. It concerns all religions. 
Second, as of today the upholding of the full symbiosis between 
politics and religion is limited to a rather small number of movements, 
groups, and leaders – Tali-ban as Ameri-can. In the real world we 
rather primarily have to do with mixtures of liberal, illiberal, secular 
and religious politics. In short, there are degrees of hell. And even 
then, for instance, according to the World Value Survey, there is no 
major difference in the view on democracy amongst Muslims living in 
‘Muslim countries’ and for example Christians living in Christian 
dominated areas. Maybe we overstate or confuse a number of ‘self-
evident’ differences. 
Beyond categorical questions and fundamentalist answers, the 
more interesting dilemmas and fruitful questions are, therefore, what 
issues that are deemed to be public in Muslim and other politics, and 
what citizens that are supposed to control these public affairs on the 
basis of political equality. In other words: what problems and issues of 
common concern are not handled publicly in Muslim and other 
politics but within the private sphere, on the market, within the family 
and/or by religious leaders? And what people are not granted full civic 
rights? For instance because they are women, belong to another 
religion, do not have one, or are simply so economically vulnerable 
that they can not claim their rights? These questions are subject to 
dispute around the world. There are many positions and no simple 
answers. Maybe, for instance, the two most powerful political 
tendencies in contemporary Indonesia which tend to be viewed as 
opposites – the neo-liberal (i.e. market-)  and Muslim value based 
politics – have more in common than what is usually taken for granted, 
thus forming a democratically most dangerous unholy alliance. 
A Democratic Point of View 
To discuss the dilemmas, we may wish to spend somewhat less 
time than has become fashionable to examine exciting more or less 
extremist tendencies and struggles in Muslim politics that fit into the 
Western picture of ‘the other’, to allow instead for more knowledge of 
the democracy that is supposed to be affected, but which is often 
viewed as a black box.  
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This is important, because democracy is not one-dimensional. It is 
true that its generally accepted aim is popular control of public affairs 
on the basis of political equality. But this in turn calls for a large 
number of promotional means or institutions with a reasonable 
performance, substance and geographical scope; institutions which all 
people must then also be reasonably able to promote and use. The 
specific shape of the institutions may of course be contextual. For 
instance, the electoral systems may vary. But all the instruments are 
supposed to generate, firstly, an impartial judicial system (including 
equal citizenship, justice and the rule of law) and a number of civic, 
political and other human rights; secondly, direct and representative 
mechanisms for politically equal government and administration of 
public affairs; and thirdly, direct civic engagement by way of civil 
society (including media, culture, academia and associational life).1 
                                                 
1 While the International Handbook of Democracy Assessments by Professor David 
Beetham et. Al. (IDEA 2002) for instance, list some 85 institutions to generate 
democracy, the number has been boiled down to about half in Demos’ (The Indonesian 
Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies) National Survey. (Priyono et.al. 
2007 and Törnquist 2006). This is Demos’ list of the outcomes that must be promoted 
by contextual rights and institutions to thus generate and sustain meaningful 
democracy: (1) Citizenship, Law and Rights: Equal citizenship, The rights of minorities, 
migrants and refugees, Reconciliation of horizontal conflicts , Government support 
and respect for international law and UN human rights treaties, Subordination of the 
government and public officials to the rule of law, Equal and secure access to justice, 
The integrity and independence of the judiciary, Freedom from physical violence and 
the fear of Freedom of speech, assembly and organisation, Freedom to carry out trade 
union activity, Freedom of religion and belief, Freedom of language and culture, 
Gender equality and emancipation, The rights of children, The right to employment, 
social security and other basic needs, The right to basic education, including citizen’s 
rights and duties, Good corporate governance and business regulations in the public 
interest. (2) Representative and accountable government: Free and fair general elections at 
central, regional, and local levels, Free and fair separate elections of e.g. governors, 
mayors, Reflection of vital issues and interests among people by political parties, 
Abstention from abusing religious or ethnic sentiments, symbols and doctrines by 
political parties, Independence of money politics and powerful vested interests by 
political parties, Membership-based control of parties, and responsiveness and 
accountability of parties to their constituencies, Parties ability to form and run 
government, The transparency and accountability of elected government, at all levels, 
The transparency and accountability of the executive/public civil servants, at all levels, 
Democratic decentralisation of government on the basis of the subsidiarity principle, 
The transparency and accountability of the military and police to elected government 
and the public, The capacity of the government to combat paramilitary groups, 
hoodlums and organised crime, The independence of the government from foreign 
intervention (except UN conventions and applicable international law), Government’s 
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Similarly, people’s capacity to foster and use the institutions certainly 
varies with the social and economic conditions. Yet, the necessary 
minimum requirement is sufficient presence in the political terrain, 
capability to turn non-private issues into public matters, to enrol 
people in the efforts to promote them (i.e. to politicise issues and 
people), as well as to navigate the system. If this is not the case, the 
demos (the people) tend to be subordinated subjects rather than 
politically equal citizens.  
The benefit of this conceptual exercise is that we may discuss the 
relative impact of dominant political tendencies in less sweeping terms: 
in what way does what politics affect what institutions and civic 
capacities? Neo-liberal as well as Muslim politicians may well respect 
the general aim of democracy but yet involve in fierce struggles as well 
as unholy alliances over the various instruments and capacities. Their 
positions on four questions are most important:  (1) what constitute 
public affairs, (2) what constitute the demos, (3) what are the substance, 
performance and spread of the democratic institutions, and (4) how 
shall people be able to use them to control the public affairs? Let us 
begin by examining briefly the possible implications. 
First, if only a few societal issues are considered to be public, there 
will be little left to take joint decisions about and few resources to 
share. Thus, democracy will be next to irrelevant. Typically, while 
Muslims tend to exclude a number of questions that people have in 
common from the public sphere, and rather leave them to the 
husband, family and religious leaders, neo-liberalism predicates that 
several questions of common concern are best governed through 
privatisation in favour of the market, corporate organisations, self-
management by ‘responsible citizens’ (for instance the villa-owners in a 
residential area) and the individuals themselves.  
Second, if the people (demos) that is supposed to control the public 
affairs is defined on the basis of religious or similar identities (such as 
                                                                                                      
independence from strong interest groups and capacity to eliminate corruption and 
abuse of power. (3) Democratically oriented civil society and direct participation: Freedom of the 
press, art and academic world, Public access to and the reflection of different views 
within media, art and the academic world, Citizens’ participation in extensive 
independent civic associations, Transparency, accountability and democracy within 
civic organisations, All social groups’ – including women’s – extensive access to and 
participation in public life, Peoples’ direct contact with the public services and 
servants. 
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ethnic, clan, or birth place) rather than membership in a mutually 
defined public community, the political equality, which is fundamental 
to democracy, tends to be limited to special groups rather than to the 
population at large. It is true that only a few Muslims strive for an 
Islamic state, thus equating religious affiliation with citizenship. 
Usually, however, the many others who accept elements of pluralism 
still maintain that belief in some kind of an authorised God is a 
defining element of the demos and may be seen as basic sub-categories. 
All Indonesian citizens, for instance, are required to believe in one God 
(even the Hindus honouring many and the agnostics honouring none). 
Interestingly, moreover, similarly communitarian definitions of the 
demos regarding political representation seem to be quite possible to 
combine with neo-liberal positions in relation to the economy and 
certain individual freedoms, most recently, for instance, in the case of 
Hindu fundamentalist parties in India or the US policy in the Middle 
East and Afghanistan.  
Third, within the framework of narrowly defined public affairs and 
the communitarian classifications of the demos¸ it is essential, of course, 
that at least the intrinsic means of democracy (that were presented 
earlier) are acknowledged. In-spite of the neo-liberal and Muslim views 
of public affairs and the demos, democracy may still develop and alter 
the constraints if the substance of the necessary instruments to 
promote democracy is not too narrow, if their performance and 
geographic scope is also not too poor, and if large parts of the 
population have significant capacity to promote and use them. 
Unfortunately, however, there are a number of additional problems in 
this respect. Free and fair elections as well as decentralisation, for 
instance, may be respected within Muslim as well as neo-liberal 
politics, but several of the other means of democracy tend to be 
weakened by the religion and market respectively. On the one hand, 
Muslim politics usually hollows out several of the inevitable freedoms 
such as ‘equal citizenship’, ‘equal and secure access to justice’, ‘freedom 
of speech, assembly and association’ and ‘gender equality and 
emancipation’. On the other hand, neo-liberal preference for the 
strong actors on the markets limits the capacity of large sections of the 
population to actually promote and use the liberties. Further, while 
Muslim politics may promote measures against corruption, and neo-
liberal actors may foster the rule of the laws they have shaped, both 
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tendencies neglect independent popular representation to promote 
politically equal control of public affairs. 
Hence, several dimensions need to be considered. In a brief article 
like this, one way of capturing the prime tendencies is to focus on (a) 
the relevant dynamics between the major centres of power–the 
communitarian groups, the private business and market, and the state–, 
and (b) their relationship to the people.  
 
Figure 1 : Relations between the critical centres of power and their 
links to people 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While Muslim as well as neo-liberal politicians often co-operate 
with state and government to gain favours and legitimacy, they also 
tend to agree on limiting the undemocratic statist or democratic public 
sphere in general and independent organisations connecting people 
and politics in particular. Their common alternatives to civic linkages 
are, on the one hand, communitarian mediation and patron-clientelism, 
and on the other, the invisible hands of the dominant actors on the 
market and civic self-management.  
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Historical Trends 
In view of this framework, what are the major aspects in the 
development of Muslim politics and democracy in Indonesia? Some 
historical aspects will be discussed first and the contemporary situation 
thereafter.  
The traders who brought Islam with them to Indonesia did not use 
the same methods of state-backed repression, plundering and occupa-
tion as did the European colonizers in their pursuit for land and 
wealth. The foundation of Muslim politics rather seems to have been 
the combination of business and communitarian linkages, in negotiated 
agreement with various centres of political power. 
The leading anti-colonial movements in the early to mid 20th 
century combined Muslim faith and ethics with the ideals of the 
French revolution, the American declaration of freedom, and Marx’ 
critique of capitalism and imperialism. Of course, some were politically 
more devoted Muslim than others. But the fundamental point is that 
all major political streams compromised their civic programmes and 
aspirations with communitarian mediation as well as direct charismatic-
populist links between politics and people. This was partially altered 
only by the communist led popular movements in the fifties, which 
tried to develop more independent civic connections between state 
and people. 
Meanwhile neither Islam nor any other religion succeeded in 
dominating the Indonesian archipelago and become state builders. 
Religious extremists, whether Muslim or Christian, never won broad 
based popular support. This non-statist legacy was fundamental to 
Muslims and others who guarded the values of pluralism and tolerance, 
both as a way of handling conflicts and as an ideal. In fact, the broad-
minded groups fought against both Japanese fascists and European 
racists – attempting thus to build an embryonic democratic society and 
polity. It was perhaps overly idealistic, given their weak independent 
civic-political associations, but what else could they do?  
Moreover, the fact remains that it was neither the followers of 
Islamic socio-religious reform movements nor communist worker and 
peasant movements who really undermined democracy towards the 
end of the fifties and early sixties, but rather some of the political 
leaders who subdued to European Cold War logic. There were three 
main tendencies. The socialists with prime roots among the emerging 
middle classes were unable to mobilise the masses and thus resorted to 
  
Olle Törnquist 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 01, Number 01, June 2007 
8 
semi-authoritarian elitism. The broad nationalist and Muslim groups 
opted for combinations of communitarian and state based clientelism 
plus populism to gain followers. Tragically, finally, the communists, 
who had really managed to start building the first relatively 
independent mass based political movements also followed suit. 
It is true that during the endgame in 1965-66, Muslim youths were 
mobilized by the military into well-organised youth groups to carry out 
the massacre of radical nationalists and communists. This had, 
however, less to do with religion than political and economic factors, 
combined with the historical – and still applied – method of privatising 
the means of violence through extreme political groupings, gangsters 
and militias.   
Nor did Suharto receive much opposition from the Christian and 
liberal western part of the world during his thirty year long reign. 
Rather, Suharto was backed up by the West and cooperated with well-
educated Christian technocrats, officers, and businessmen who were 
lacking broad and thus potentially threatening social or political bases.  
Further, once having eliminated the relatively independent popular 
movements, Suharto could tap new substantial oil resources to 
subordinate communitarian and business groups and balance their 
mediation between state and people by way of direct state-
authoritarian linkages to semi-citizens who were thus turned subjects. 
It is true that towards the end of his rule Suharto tried to withstand 
critical students and popular discontent by flirting with Muslim 
intellectuals and their constituents. That said, naturally, the democracy 
movement that caused his demise in 1998 was anyway largely Muslim. 
For a brief period of time, many students were even able to build their 
own civic culture and catch people’s imagination that this would be 
possible to scale up as an alternative democratic relation between 
people and state. But of course, lacking deep social roots and 
organisation, the dreams did not come true. 
The violence that followed Suharto’s step down from power was 
to a certain extent targeted by Muslims against Christians. But these 
conflicts were less about religion than the political and economic 
contradictions in Indonesia. As such, empirical research shows clearly 
that the main conflicts in the country have little to do with religion. 
People demand the same kinds of freedoms, rights, work, fair 
treatment and democratic representation as people do in other 
developing countries. The problem is that these conflicts and demands 
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are not reflected in organized politics. In such instances, when facing a 
problem, one often turns to religious and other identity-based 
networks and tries and seeks special arrangements, thus also 
nourishing corruption.  
Contemporary Dynamics 
Of course it is troublesome that an increasing number of people 
now feel that the best way of fighting corruption and commercial 
moral disintegration is to support the Muslim brotherhood party PKS 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/Prosperous Justice Party) and similar groups. 
Currently, the PKS and other parties (which do not want to lose out by 
being less devoted) are enforcing religious laws on the local level and 
trying to gather political majority in favour of a national anti-
pornography bill, which in essence does not turn against dirty men but 
women who at least try to dress and move about as they wish. It is in 
such instances that the pluralism and tolerance that turned many 
Muslims into pioneering democrats during the liberation struggle, in 
the early fifties and in fighting Suharto is further undermined.  
The current dynamics is worrying. I am primarily drawing on the 
previous case studies and data collected by Demos among senior 
reflective pro-democracy activists around the country,2 the opinion 
polls, reports and discourse in national media (including Tempo and 
Jakarta Post), the monitoring by various NGOs of popular discontent, 
and the particularly important research on the increasingly localised 
politics.3 When reading the empirical evidence in view of the analytical 
framework of this article, the crucial political dynamics stand out as a 
triangular one between dominant actors with powers and interests 
related to (a) the ‘decapitated’ state at the top, thus being weakened, 
fragmented and localised, (b) the increasingly strong religious and 
other communal forces, and (c) the equally reinforced interests related 
to private business and market, in each of the fundamental corners. 
Nobody is rooted in ‘their own’ corner only but there are horse-trading 
in all directions. The unholy alliance is the strongest – between, on the 
                                                 
2 See Stanley Prasetyo, et. al., Indonesia’s Post-Soeharto Democracy Movement (Jakarta: 
Demos, 2003); Cf. Priyono, et. al. (eds.), Making Democracy Meaningful: Problems and 
Options in Indonesia (Forthcoming) (Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS, 2007); 
additional results on http://www.demos.or.id. 
3 Including the results from the pioneering research programme ‘Renegotiating 
Boundaries’, see http://www.kitlv.nl/renegotiating.html.  
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one hand, the religious and other communitarian groups, who reduce 
the public sphere in favour of for instance religiously prescribed moral 
rules and values, and, on the other, the pro-business and market 
groups that privatise public resources. The loudspeakers on top of the 
Mosques and in the shopping malls do not speak the same language, 
but the high volume is the same. Meanwhile, both camps retain of 
course their increasingly informal control of patches of the 
‘decapitated’ state.   
Worst: in-spite of attempts at building democracy, increasingly 
many relations between state and people are being mediated by these 
forces. The previously matching authoritarian top-down linkages under 
Suharto have disintegrated. The previous predominance of clientelism 
and populism is back in full swing. However, personality-oriented 
populism under President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono and a large 
number of equally directly elected governors, mayors and regents is 
much more conservative and money-driven than the classical rural 
romantic brand of founding father Sukarno. Most importantly: nothing 
is there to substitute for the comparatively modern communist led 
popular movements. The independent civic-political links between 
state and people remain critically weak. 
Yet, the reason for this democratic deficit has less to do with 
Islamic religion than with the decades of authoritarianism, the crusades 
in Iraq, the disrespect of Muslims in, for instance, a certain Danish 
newspaper, and the fact that Indonesian secular democrats have not 
been successful in building a well functioning political party or block 
with broad based support instead of complaining about dirty politics 
and withdrawing into a myriad of civil society organizations without 
much coordination or power.  
The empirical evidence in Demos’ national expert survey (in 
cooperation with the democracy movement and the University of 
Oslo) is overwhelming. Eight hundred well reputed local activists in 
Indonesia’s thirty two provinces have answered three hundred and 
thirty questions about the problems and conditions for democracy. 
The main problem, they say, is that the existence of a number of 
freedoms and a broad civil society has not been able to promote and 
secure people’s basic needs, a well functioning legal system, nor a 
representative and responsible leadership. This implies that democratic 
elections have not in fact led to the interests and conflicts of ordinary 
people being represented. It also implies that the important battle 
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against corruption, nepotism, and centralism has weakened the state’s 
resources and capacity under a neo-liberalist regime rather than 
strengthening democratic public capacities, meaning that clientelism 
and corruption continues to operate. The dominant elite have on the 
one hand become less exclusive and adapted to the rules of the 
democratic game, but are on the other hand monopolising and abusing 
the nominally democratic institutions. The pro-democratic forces are 
still important but politically marginalised as individuals in elitist parties 
or as activists in civil society organisations without much coordination 
and a social basis among the people at large.  
In short, there are no visible real alternatives. Democracy is 
squeezed from all corners. The powerful groups tend to reinforce the 
triangular alliances and little can be done by people themselves. The 
independent links between state and people (for instance through 
popular controlled parties and interest organisations) are very weak. 
Most relations between the state and the people are mediated through 
the communitarian groups and the business and market, thus 
cementing clientelism and corruption. Hence, the problem is not 
religion and Islam as such but that democratisation has run aground 
for a number of other reasons. The real challenge is to develop more 
independent means of political representation. So what can be done? 
Democratic Options 
The Aceh peace agreement is an illustration for what is possible. If 
Indonesian democracy is widened at the local level, fighting in the 
battlefield may be transferred onto the political arena and foster 
development. Demos’ survey indicates that the major task in the country 
at large is to build popularly rooted and representative civic-political 
organisations. 
However, pro-democrats face grim realities. The same survey 
shows very clearly that most of them remain just as socially floating in 
the public discourse, without firm roots among the people at large, as 
the masses were meant to be politically floating in the villages under 
Suharto. Meanwhile, the neo-liberal hollowing out of public resources 
and governance sustains incorporation of people into politics through 
clientelism and populism. With less public resources, people need even 
more fixers, patrons and communitarian ‘solidarity’. Thus pro-
democratic promotion of public solutions to people’s problems and 
programmatic platforms for pro-poor policies are considered fine but 
unrealistic. Nobody wins an election without promising instead special 
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favours and patronage. Besides, most civic organisations are miserable 
vote-catchers, resorting instead to pressure politics and lobbyism.  
As a consequence, self-help programmes gain importance – 
including some civic but primarily communitarian and most frequently 
Muslim-oriented. Many of them are vital to the people affected, but in 
the process well endowed and vulnerable people are separated, even 
the poor are fragmented in different projects and communities, and it 
is difficult to reconcile the various efforts with the principle of political 
equality and basic public rights. Perhaps it is possible instead to seek 
inspiration from comparative studies suggesting that struggle for 
democratic regulations may serve as a realistic and unifying supple-
mentary framework; a framework sustaining principles of universal 
social and economic rights and bringing self-management in line with 
democratic political equality and impartiality without engaging in 
unrealistic demands for full public ownership and control. Yet, this is 
easier said than done. Participatory budgeting or decentralised people’s 
planning, for instance, is not possible to introduce by design only but 
calls for political change and facilitation.4 Moreover, as Mushtaq Khan 
convincingly reminds us, there must be some resources and capacities 
to share for a reasonably meaningful democracy to make sense.5 If not, 
Muslim and other forms of communitarianism and clientelism will 
flourish as much as the dominant forces on the market. 
How does one generate more public resources? Post-colonial 
countries like Indonesia continue to suffer from uneven development. 
In other words, the state may still be big but it is not strong. And the 
advanced sectors of capital and middle classes are not always 
progressive but benefit from the underdeveloped poor sectors and 
from primitive accumulation through coercion and dominance, in 
symbiotic relation with state- and communitarian based groups. These 
are the roots of the dominant actors that distort Indonesia’s social and 
economic development and monopolise its fledgling democracy.  
What can be done? The established strategies to alter the stalemate 
are democratically unviable. Previous attempts at state-led ‘national 
democratic development’ like during Sukarno undermined democracy 
                                                 
4 See, John Harriss et. al. (eds.), Politicising Democracy, The New Local Politics of 
Democratisation (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).  
5 Mushtaq H Khan, “Markets, States and Democracy: Patron-Client Networks and the 
Case for Democracy in Developing Countries”, Democratization, Vol. 12 No. 5 
(December 2005), pp. 707-724. 
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and have been invalidated by capitalist globalisation. The crafting of 
institutions during the ‘third wave of democracy’ to turn powerful 
actors into democrats – including the efforts by international experts 
and ‘moderate’ reform oriented sections of the elite after Suharto6  – 
has proved as insufficient in Indonesia as elsewhere in the South and 
the former Eastern Block. The powerful actors avoid or hijack the new 
rules of the game. Efforts to give priority instead to the shaping of a 
liberal European-like rechtsstaat by way of ‘good governance reforms’, 
ahead of further democratisation, as frequently argued by the IMF and 
World Bank,7 suffer from the weakness of liberal oriented bourgeois 
and middle classes. Hence is thus likely to call for more or less 
authoritarian solutions, as most recently in the royal-military and urban 
middle class coup in Thailand. Neither is there a reasonably democratic 
developmental state at hand that can generate more public resources 
through pro-business policies.8 Worst: the pro-democracy activists 
have almost nothing to offer in terms of a realistic alternative. The 
recent admiration for Latin American populist-nationalists Chavez and 
Morales has little relevance beyond struggle against international 
finance capital and foreign dominance of natural resources. The crucial 
issues of how to fight and build an alternative to the symbiosis 
between state, communitarianism and private business, increase 
economic growth for more public resources and demonopolise 
democracy are almost as neglected as during the hegemony of the 
radical nationalists in the late fifties and early sixties.9 
The major popular alternative top these problematic roadmaps is 
Muslim aspirations at a value-based welfare state. The general thesis 
(from for instance Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Malaysia) seems to be that 
                                                 
6 R. William Liddle (eds.), Crafting Indonesian Democracy (Jakarta: PPW-LIPI, Ford 
Foundation and Mizan Pustaka, 2001).  
7 See http://www.worldbank.org./wbi/governance. For a blunt introduction in the 
Indonesian discourse, see Guido Tabellini’s “Economic Reforms Proceed 
Democracy”, Jakarta Post, 15 September, 2005. 
8 A major weakness in the former mentioned article by Khan. See Khan, “Markets, 
States and Democracy”. 
9 For an analysis of the problems of the Indonesian radicals in this respect, see Olle 
Törnquist, Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia 
(London: Zed, 1984), and for comparisons with India, see Idem, What’s Wrong with 
Marxism? Vo.1: On Capitalists and State in India and Indonesia. Vol. 2: On Peasants and 
Workers in India and Indonesia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1989 & 1991).  
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the problems of development and democracy are due primarily to 
insufficient moral codes and values in local communities and families. 
This drawback, it is argued, paves the way for individualistic 
greediness, corruption and exploitative and western dominated neo-
liberal capitalism. Consequently, the public democratic sphere with 
extensive liberal freedoms should be reduced in favour of religiously 
governed ethic codes, community- and family relations. Beyond these 
restrictions, however, several of the other elements of democracy may 
apply, including free and fair elections. This kind of privatisation is 
better, it is argued, than the neo-liberal and exploitative one. For 
instance, there are social-welfare policies with roots in community 
contribution and redistribution (the internationally best know case of 
which is probably Hamas), co-operatives and the interest free Islamic 
banking system.  
The way that this thinking is gaining quick ground in Indonesia is 
obviously related to the failure of the other perspectives to make 
democracy meaningful for ordinary people after the Asian economic 
crisis and the fall of the Suharto regime – supplemented again, of 
course, by the Western crusades in the Middle East.  
From a democratic point of view, the main problem, in addition to 
the serious reductions of the public sphere and illiberal measures, that 
most of the comparatively impressive anti-corruption and social 
welfare measures are (as already pointed out) meditated between state 
and people through communities and patron-client relations rather 
than direct and through impartial institutions facilitated by civic 
organisation. This breeds rivalries, undermines the anti-corruption 
efforts and reduces the pro-democratic potential. There is also to my 
knowledge no strategy for how to break away from the unholy 
alliances between the communitarian ideals and related strongmen in 
relation to both the state and private business at central and local 
levels. This is not a new problem, but probably the basic reason for 
why the two major groups of semi-democratic Muslims – one related 
to then president Habibie and the other to the later president Wahid – 
never managed to form the real alternatives to Suharto that they were 
striving for. And there are no clear signs of change in this respect. 
In brief, therefore, efforts at fostering representation of potentially 
powerful agents in favour of an alternative development project and 
thus more public resources still seem to rest with the civic pro-
democrats. If not, meaningful democracy is likely to be a lost case. To 
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my knowledge, the historical and present attempts in contexts like 
Indonesia where international economic competition can not be 
avoided, seem to focus on the promotion of representation of 
powerful groups that would be in favour of limited growth oriented 
pacts between sections of labour and capital; sections which in turn 
may develop common interest in public resources for general public 
welfare policies and the need for democracy to facilitate such 
agreements. Unfortunately, however, as compared to countries such as 
South Africa and Brazil where these problems are on top of the 
agenda, there seem to be little interest in Indonesia. Hence, the playing 
field is once again left open for the unholy alliance between Muslim 
communitarianism and neo-liberalism.  
Conclusion 
In short, the Indonesian lesson is obvious. Muslim democrats 
liberated the country and re-introduced the world’s third largest 
democracy. On the one hand it is true that this is not without 
problems, currently including the local introduction of religious rather 
than democratic laws and the basic ideas behind the anti-pornography 
bill. On the other hand it is also true that the Muslim semi-democrats 
are politically quite pragmatic, in spite of occasional declarations. Just 
as in Turkey they may adjust to the wider comprehensive sets of 
democratic principles and instruments, including with regard to 
citizenship rights and political equality, both with regard to the input as 
well as output side of democracy.10 However, this adjustment seem to 
rest with to the independent development of a sufficiently strong and 
meaningful democracy that may discipline the communitarian 
tendencies – just as, conversely, the worrying reduction of the public 
sphere and clientelistic brand of social welfare have been related to the 
poor development of democracy.  
But when we worry less about Islam’s negative impact and more 
about how the basic hindrances against meaningful democracy may be 
overcome by building politically equal citizenship and representative 
                                                 
10 Martin van Bruinessen, “Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and 
Democratization”, in Samuel Hanneman & Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds.), Indonesia in 
Transition, Rethinking ’Civil Society’, ’Region’ and ’Crisis’ (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 
2004). Cf. Wajidi, Farid (2004). “NU Youth and the Making of Civil Society: Notes 
from the Field”. in Samuel Hanneman & Henk Schulte Nordholt (eds.), Indonesia in 
Transition, Rethinking ’Civil” Society, ’Region’ and ’Crisis’. 
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links between people and politics – so that democratic regulations may 
contain communitarianism, turn self-management more politically 
equal, and foster growth and public welfare oriented growth – the 
worrying connections between politics and religion will be far less 
significant. The basic changes that seem to be needed in order to 
transform the democratically destructive dynamics into a more 
productive are indicated in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2 : Transforming the democratically destructive dynamics? 
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